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IMMIGRATION TO BLUE CITIES IN RED STATES: THE 
BATTLEGROUND BETWEEN SANCTUARY AND EXCLUSION  
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ABSTRACT 
An ongoing intrastate immigration regulation battle between cities, municipalities, and states with the Trump 
Administration intervening with litigation and executive orders has dominated the immigration federalism 
landscape.  Some states, cities, and localities have passed sanctuary laws and policies seeking to protect immigrant 
communities by not inquiring into an individual’s immigration status, while other states have begun to pass 
exclusionary anti-sanctuary laws, sanctioning non-compliance with federal immigration laws.   
The Trump Administration’s policies, along with the resulting litigation, place immigration federalism in an 
unprecedented context.  This Symposium Article interrogates the concept of immigration federalism examining the 
political and ideological contours of state and local exclusionary and sanctuary laws highlighting new issues that 
have surfaced under the Trump Administration’s policies.  This Article utilizes the red state and blue city intrastate 
federalism conflicts within the State of Tennessee to highlight the political dynamics that govern the passing of 
state and local exclusionary and sanctuary laws.  The new landscape of exclusionary and sanctuary laws has 
increasingly emphasized a red state and blue city political divide.  In this context, this Article argues that recent 
immigration federalism standoffs center around political divisions which fail to engage in principled evaluations 
of which level of government—federal, state, or local—should be the locus of immigration regulation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The January 2018 Symposium topic is particularly relevant: Executive 
Power: Immigration Reform in the New Administration focusing on Sanctuary Cities: 
State and Federal Standoffs.  Since 2006, there has been an ongoing battle 
between cities, municipalities, states, and the federal government over 
immigration regulation.  In this setting, states and cities have passed both 
sanctuary and exclusionary immigration laws.  The push for state and local 
immigration laws began with conservative legislative groups like the 
American Legislative Exchange Council drafting and promoting subfederal 
legislatures to enact exclusionary anti-immigrant laws,1 whereas Sanctuary 
laws and policies seek to protect immigrant communities by not inquiring 
into an individual’s immigration status when providing state or local services 
including law enforcement.  The intent is to create a safe space for 
immigrants.  The concept of sanctuary has evolved in the United States to 
signify a moral and ethical obligation to protect migrants from unjust 
removal from the United States.2  
This commentary interrogates the concept of immigration federalism, 
examining the political and ideological contours of state and local sanctuary 
laws in the context of both state and the Trump Administration’s 
exclusionary policies.  I utilize the intrastate federalism conflicts within the 
State of Tennessee to highlight the political dynamics that govern the passing 
of state and local sanctuary laws analyzing new issues that have surfaced 
under the Trump Administration.  In this context, the commentary argues 
that recent immigration federalism standoffs center around political divisions 
which fail to engage in principled evaluations of which level of government—
federal, state, or local—should be the locus of immigration regulation. 
 
 
 1 See NANCY MACLEAN, DEMOCRACY IN CHAINS: THE DEEP HISTORY OF THE RADICAL RIGHT’S 
STEALTH PLAN FOR AMERICA xix (2017) (“‘What we’ve witness,’ he [William Cronon] said, is part 
of a ‘well-planned and well-coordinated national campaign.’ (italics added).  Presciently, he 
suggested that others look into the funding and activities of a then little-known organization that 
referred to itself as the American Legislative Exchange Council (ALEC) and kept its elected 
members to a secret from outsiders.  It was producing hundreds of ‘model laws’ each year for 
Republican legislators to bring home to enact in their states—and nearly 30 percent were going 
through.  Alongside laws to devastate labor unions were others that would rewrite tax codes, undo 
environmental protections, privatize many public resources, and require police to take action 
against undocumented immigrants?”); see also Karla Mari McKanders, Welcome to Hazleton! “Illegal” 
Immigrants Beware: Local Immigration Ordinances and What the Federal Government Must Do About It, 39 LOY. 
U. CHI. L.J. 1, 48–49 (2007) (citing California legislature promoting the passing of Save Our State 
anti-immigrant laws across the country). 
 2 See Rose Cuison Villazor, What Is a “Sanctuary,” 61 S.M.U. L. REV. 133, 135 (2008) (stating that 
“the use of the word sanctuary conveyed a sense of moral and ethical obligation that churches and, 
to some extent, the local governments aimed to evoke”). 
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Immigration scholarship has extensively examined the federalism 
implications of past and recent state and local laws.3  Recent immigration 
federalism scholarship has analyzed how Congress’s devolution of 
immigration power to states has provided space for progressive state 
legislatures to substantially affect immigration law;4 as well as state and local 
push back against the Trump Administration’s immigration policies.5  
My previous scholarship addressing immigration federalism was framed 
based upon immigration being under the exclusive authority of the federal 
government.6  My previous articles posited that “[f]ederalism principles may 
be employed to simplify the system and safeguard immigrants’ rights.”7  
The Trump Administration’s policies, along with the resulting litigation, 
place immigration federalism in an unprecedented context.  This 
commentary examines this new context.  Part I examines the contours the 
Trump Administration’s unprecedented immigration policies, executive 
actions, and the resulting impact on immigration federalism.  Part II 
 
 3 See, e.g., Clare Huntington, The Constitutional Dimension of Immigration Federalism, 61 VAND. L. REV. 
787, 798 (2008) (discussing the blurring line between national and state governments with respect 
to immigration laws); Karla Mari McKanders, Federal Preemption and Immigrants’ Rights, 3 WAKE 
FOREST J.L. & POL’Y 333, 334 (2013) (examining the relationship between federal and local laws 
through the lens of Arizona’s Senate Bill 1070); Karla Mari McKanders, Unforgiving of Those Who 
Trespass Against U.S.: State Laws Criminalizing Immigration Status, 12 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 331, 334, 345–
52 (2011) (arguing the Immigration and Nationality Act precludes states from enacting immigration 
laws under the federal preemption doctrine); Karla Mari McKanders, Sustaining Tiered Personhood: 
Jim Crow and Anti-Immigrant Laws, 26 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 163, 169–70 (2010) 
(theorizing that state and local anti-immigrant laws led to the segregation, exclusion, and 
degradation of Latinos from American society in the same way that Jim Crow laws excluded African 
Americans from membership in social, political, and economic institutions within the United States 
and relegated them to second-class citizenship status); Karla Mari McKanders, The Constitutionality 
of State and Local Laws Targeting Immigrants, 31 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 579, 590–91, 599–600 
(2009) (discussing preemption of state and local immigration laws under Supreme Court precedent); 
McKanders, supra note 1, at 48–49 (arguing that Congress must begin to explicitly preempt state 
immigration laws); Huyen Pham, The Constitutional Right Not to Cooperate?  Local Sovereignty and the Federal 
Immigration Power, 74 U. CIN. L. REV. 1373, 1376–77 (2006) (discussing whether the federal 
government may require state governments to cooperate in enforcement of immigration laws under 
the federal preemption doctrine); Cristina M. Rodríguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration 
Regulation, 106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 620–26 (2008) (discussing federal preemption and state 
immigration regulation); L. Darnell Weeden, Local Laws Restricting the Freedom of Undocumented 
Immigrants as Violations of Equal Protection and Principles of Federal Preemption, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 479, 
491–97 (2008) (explaining that the power to regulate immigration has historically and 
constitutionally been entrusted to the federal government).    
 4 See Leticia M. Saucedo, States of Desire: How Immigration Law Allows States to Attract Desired Immigrants, 
52 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 471, 476 (2018) (focusing on how states have achieved integrationist, pre-
immigration aims rather than restricting immigration in light of emerging immigration federalism). 
 5 See Christopher N. Lasch et al., Understanding “Sanctuary Cities,” 59 B.C. L. REV. 1703, 1708 (2018) 
(detailing the efforts of local politicians to enact “sanctuary” policies and denounce the Trump 
Administration’s deportation efforts). 
 6 McKanders, The Constitutionality of State and Local Laws Targeting Immigrants, supra note 3, at 590–91; 
McKanders, supra note 1, at 48–49; see also Karla Mari McKanders, Sustaining Tiered Personhood: Jim 
Crow and Anti-Immigrant Laws, 26 HARV. J. ON RACIAL & ETHNIC JUST. 163, 169–70 (2010) 
(summarizing previous articles, which analyzed immigration as a federally preempted area of law). 
 7 McKanders, supra note 1, at 40.  
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examines state and local resistance to the Trump Administration’s policies 
specifically examining recent sanctuary and anti-sanctuary state and local 
immigration laws.  This Part utilizes the example of the intrastate conflicts in 
Tennessee to understand the contours of intrastate immigration and the 
Trump Administration’s federalism battle.  Part III examines the resulting 
litigation between the Trump Administration and sub-federal governments.  
The commentary concludes with an analysis of what the future holds for 
immigration federalism. 
I.  IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM AND THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION 
The Trump Administration has taken unprecedented unilateral 
executive actions to regulate immigration.  The Administration’s unilateral 
actions have bypassed Congress; reinterpreted longstanding provisions of the 
Immigration and Nationality Act; and attempted to overturn longstanding 
Board of Immigration Appeals and federal court precedent.  To justify the 
changes, the Administration has employed the doctrines of sovereignty and 
national security, which underlie the executive branch’s authority over 
immigration. 
The federal government’s authority over immigration is derived from 
multiple places.  While there is no specific provision in the Constitution that 
gives the federal government exclusive jurisdiction over immigration, 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 4 of the Constitution provides that Congress shall 
create a uniform rule of naturalization.8  Pursuant to this clause, Congress 
enacted the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965 (the “INA”).9 
The Trump Administration has relied on the plenary powers doctrine to 
support its broad non-legislative changes to immigration law.  The plenary 
powers doctrine was first articulated in the 1889 Supreme Court case, Chae 
Chan Ping v. United States, which challenged the Chinese Exclusion Act.10  In 
Chae Chan Ping, the Supreme Court upheld the Exclusion Act, even though it 
contained a discriminatory animus in deference to the federal government’s 
sweeping powers over immigration.11   
 
 8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4. 
 9 Immigration and Nationality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-236, 79 Stat. 911 (codified as amended 
at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1151–1157, 1181–1182, 1201, 1254–1255, 1259, 1322, 1351 (2012)). 
 10 Chae Chan Ping v. United States (The Chinese Exclusion Case), 130 U.S. 581 (1889). 
 11 Id. at 603–04 (laying out the plenary powers doctrine which attributed the power as inherent to a 
sovereign nation); see Fiallo v. Bell, 430 U.S. 787, 792 (1977) (“[O]ver no conceivable subject is the 
legislative power of Congress more complete than over the admission of aliens.” (quoting Oceanic 
Steam Navigation Co. v. Stranahan, 214 U.S. 320, 339 (1909))); Chris Nwachukwu Okeke & James 
A.R. Nafzinger, United States Migration Law: Essentials for Comparison, 54 AM. J. COMP. L. 531, 544 
(2006) (stating that “[a] cardinal doctrine of United States constitutional law is that Congress has 
an inherent, plenary power in matters of immigration”); Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with 
Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV. 1627, 1630 (1997) (“[T]he federal government has enjoyed 
a virtual carte blanche on immigration matters.”). 
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The plenary powers doctrine is derived from a sovereign’s inherent 
authority to regulate migration and exclude migrants from its borders.12  The 
Supreme Court has held that the federal government’s power to control 
immigration is inherent in the nation’s sovereignty.13  
As a corollary to sovereignty, the Trump Administration has also invoked 
national security as a grounds for its broad authority to regulate 
immigration.14  In the recent Supreme Court case, Trump v. Hawaii, the Court 
refused to examine the President’s discriminatory animus as a motivation for 
the travel ban where he invoked national security as a grounds for instituting 
a ban on the immigration of individuals from Muslim majority countries.15 
The invocation of sovereignty and national security has permitted the 
Administration to institute sweeping reforms, including the 2017 travel 
ban,16 the attempt to change the procedures for applying for asylum,17 and, 
most relevant to this Article, the attempt to curtail the ways in which states 
and localities regulate immigrants within their jurisdiction.  
In response to the Trump Administration’s immigration policies, several 
states and localities have passed sanctuary laws, resolutions, and policies.18  
In passing sanctuary laws, states have relied upon their Tenth Amendment 
police powers to exercise control over the health, safety, and welfare of 
individuals including immigrants within their jurisdiction.19  
 
 12 See BAS SCHOTEL, ON THE RIGHT OF EXCLUSION: LAW, ETHICS, AND IMMIGRATION POLICY 14 
(2012) (defining exclusion in the migratory context through the lens of exclusion of goods).  
 13 See Fiallo, 430 U.S. at 792 (“Our cases have long recognized the power to expel or exclude aliens as 
a fundamental sovereign attribute exercised by the Government’s political departments . . . .” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)); League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Wilson, 908 F. Supp. 
755, 768 (C.D. Cal. 1995) (citing Nishimura Ekiu v. United States, 142 U.S. 651, 659 (1892)) 
(recognizing the inherent power of a sovereign nation to control its borders); see also Plyler v. Doe, 
457 U.S. 202, 225 (1982) (“Drawing upon [its Article I, Section 8] power, upon its plenary authority 
with respect to foreign relations and international commerce, and upon the inherent power of a 
sovereign to close its borders, Congress has developed a complex scheme governing admission to 
our Nation and status within our borders.”).  See generally Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 
698 (1893) (pointing out that the Constitution vests the national government with absolute control 
over international relations); Chae Chan Ping, 130 U.S. at 581 (stating that the government’s power 
to exclude aliens from the United States is not open to controversy).   
 14 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2405 (2018). 
 15 Id. at 2421. 
 16 Exec. Order No. 13,780, 82 Fed. Reg. 13209 (Mar. 6, 2017).  
 17 Aliens Subject to Bar on Entry Under Certain Presidential Proclamations, Procedures for 
Protection Claims, 83 Fed. Reg. 55,934 (Nov. 9, 2018) (codified at 8 C.F.R. § 208.13(c)(3)). 
 18 Tim Henderson, Cities, States Resist—and Assist—Immigration Crackdown in New Ways, PEW 
CHARITABLE TR.: STATELINE (Aug. 3, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-
analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/08/03/cities-states-resist-and-assist-immigration-crackdown-in-
new-ways. 
 19 See Laurel R. Boatright, Note, “Clear Eye for the State Guy”: Clarifying Authority and Trusting Federalism to 
Increase Nonfederal Assistance with Immigration Enforcement, 84 TEX. L. REV. 1633, 1666 (2006) (stating 
that even though the federal government possesses the clearest authority to enforce immigration 
laws, states bear most of the costs of failed immigration policy). 
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II.  BLUE CITY RESISTANCE TO THE ADMINISTRATION AND RED STATE 
POLICIES 
A.  Sanctuary as a Form of Resistance 
In response to the Trump Administration’s immigration policies, at the 
sub-federal level, states and localities have developed ways to protect 
immigrant communities.  Some jurisdictions have actively sought to resist the 
Trump Administration’s policies by utilizing traditional sanctuary policies 
while also developing policies to broadly address the impact of over policing 
on both immigrant and black and brown communities.20  
Sanctuary policies have deep historical roots in protecting individuals 
from the state.  The term sanctuary has become deeply contested and has no 
commonly accepted meaning.21  The sanctuary, however, is rooted in the 
Judeo-Christian heritage.22  In the Old Testament of the Bible, sanctuary 
was offered as a form of protection to individuals seeking protection.23  
Between 1982 and 1992, American churches popularized the tradition of 
sanctuary as a religious and political movement where approximately 500 
congregations in the United States sheltered Central American refugees, 
fleeing political violence from Immigration and Naturalization Service 
authorities.24  Churches were providing assistance to asylum applicants from 
Central America.25  
In 2006, another sanctuary movement emerged in response to mass 
deportations and an anti-undocumented immigrant sentiment across the 
United States.26  Sanctuary today still signifies a wide range of policies by 
federal, state, local governmental and non-governmental organizations to 
create a safe space or place for immigrant communities.27  “Local police 
departments, for example, have adopted ‘non-cooperation’ or ‘don’t ask, 
 
 20 See, e.g., Henderson, supra note 18 (explaining the ways localities have directed officers to arrest few 
individuals).  
 21 See Lasch, supra note 5, at 1709 (2018) (noting that “[t]here is no definition of ‘sanctuary’ in federal 
law and there is a wide and diverse range of activities that might qualify as a ‘sanctuary’” (quoting 
Elizabeth M. McCormick, Federal Anti-Sanctuary Law: A Failed Approach to Immigration Enforcement and a 
Poor Substitute for Real Reform, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 165, 169 n.12 (2016))).  See generally Virgil 
Wiebe, Immigration Federalism in Minnesota: What Does Sanctuary Mean in Practice?, 13 U. ST. THOMAS 
L.J. 581 (2017) (discussing varying meanings of sanctuary as applied to the home, church, schools, 
cities, and states on the federal level). 
 22 See KAREN MUSALO, JENNIFER MOORE & RICHARD A. BOSWELL, REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY: 
A COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL APPROACH 8 (4th ed. 2011). 
 23 See Villazor, supra note 2, at 138–42. 
 24 Karla McKanders, The Subnational Response: Local Intervention in Immigration Policy and Enforcement, in 
COMPASSIONATE MIGRATION AND REGIONAL POLICY IN THE AMERICAS 33–52 (Steven W. 
Bender & William F. Arrocha eds., 2017). 
 25 Villazor, supra note 2, at 135.  
 26 Id. at 144–47. 
 27 Id. at 145.  
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don’t tell’ policies to further public safety concerns.”28  The goal is for the 
policies to facilitate immigrant communities’ cooperation in reporting crimes 
without fear of deportation or  being reported to Immigration and Customs 
Enforcement (“ICE”).  
The religious origins of sanctuary imply a certain level of ethics and 
compassion towards individuals who are displaced from their home 
countries.  Contemporary uses of the word sanctuary cities and states have 
increasingly developed negative meanings.29  Immigration scholar Rose 
Villazor, states: “[the] politically motivated disapproving use of the word 
sanctuary has unfairly conflated legitimate state and local policies that serve 
local interests or policies that comply with the Constitution or federal laws 
with legislation that is intended to supersede immigration law.”30 
The term sanctuary has also been used to denote states and localities that 
limit cooperation with the enforcement of federal immigration policies—
specifically the detention of immigrants for federal immigration authorities.31  
The most recent data from the National Conference of State Legislatures 
provides that in 2017, at least twenty-five states considered sixty-six bills, 
down from one-hundred last year.32  In 2018, three states—California, Iowa, 
and Tennessee—enacted laws related to sanctuary policies.33 
B.  State and Local Intrastate Immigration Federalism Battles 
Tennessee provides a case study to analyze sanctuary laws and policies in 
the context of intrastate city and state legislature conflicts in response to the 
Trump Administration’s policies.  From 2000–2017, Tennessee experienced 
a 118.7% increase in its foreign-born population.34  This demographic 
change, coupled with the push by organizations like the American Legislative 
Exchange Council’s agenda to pass immigration laws, has given rise to wide 
 
 28 Id. at 148. 
 29 See generally McKanders, supra note 24 (discussing the proliferation of state and local immigration 
laws and the challenges they face).  
 30 Villazor, supra note 2, at 136. 
 31 What’s a Sanctuary Policy? FAQ on Federal, State and Local Action on Immigration Enforcement, NAT’L CONF. 
ST. LEGISLATURES (July 28, 2017), http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/sanctuary-policy-
faq635991795.aspx. 
 32 Id.  
 33 Report on State Immigration Laws | 2018, NAT’L CONF. ST. LEGISLATURES, (Jan. 11, 2019), 
http://www.ncsl.org/research/immigration/report-on-state-immigration-laws.aspx. 
 34 Tennessee, MIGRATION POL’Y INST., https://www.migrationpolicy.org/data/state-profiles/state/ 
demographics/TN (last visited Mar. 1, 2019); see also South Dakota Has the Fastest-Growing State Latino 
Population Since 2000, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 6, 2016), https://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/09/08/ 
latino-population-growth-and-dispersion-has-slowed-since-the-onset-of-the-great-recession/ 
ph_2016-09-08_geography-24/ (finding that from 2000–2014, Tennessee experienced a 176% 
change in its Latino population); Renee Stepler & Mark Hugo Lopez, Ranking the Latino Population in 
the States, PEW RES. CTR. (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.pewhispanic.org/2016/09/08/4-ranking-
the-latino-population-in-the-states/ (finding that 43% of the Latino population in Tennessee are 
foreign born). 
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variation amongst and within cities and counties in an attempt to pass 
sanctuary and exclusionary policies.  The variation, in some instances, has 
been divided along a Republican state-Democratic city line.  
Further, immigrant populations are moving to both the larger cities in 
Tennessee and also the more rural areas where there are factories, tourism 
(Smoky Mountains), and also farming industries.35  Like other states, 
Tennessee resembles the rest of the country politically, where Republicans 
control rural and suburban areas and Democrats control urban areas.36  The 
larger cities, Memphis and Nashville, have attempted to pass sanctuary 
immigration policies, to which the Republican majority Tennessee 
legislature has expressed opposition.  Tennessee mirrors multiple states in the 
South where there is a battle between largely Republican state legislatures 
and Democratic cities over sanctuary policies.  
Nashville is a demographically diverse city.37  In 2017, Nashville’s City 
Council considered adopting a sanctuary city ordinance.  The proposed 
ordinance prohibited the county sheriff from responding to inquiries from 
federal immigration agencies on immigrants in the county’s custody unless a 
warrant was issued.38  Further, it only mandated cooperation when legally 
 
 35 See Tennessee, NEW AM. ECON., https://www.newamericaneconomy.org/locations/tennessee/ (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2019) (noting the occupations of immigrants in Tennessee ranged from agricultural 
workers (in rural areas) painters, construction, maids, packers, maintenance workers); see also Lizzy 
Alfs, Study: Immigrants Vital to Tennessee Economy, TENNESSEAN (Feb. 21, 2017, 2:50 PM), 
https://www.tennessean.com/story/money/2017/02/21/study-immigrants-vital-tennessee-
economy/98200076/ (“The occupations with the largest share of foreign-born workers in 
Tennessee include painters; hand packers and packagers; agricultural workers; construction 
laborers; software developers; packaging and filling machine operators and tenders; food service 
managers; maids and housekeepers; physicians and surgeons; and carpenters.”). 
 36 See Sam Stockard, Democratic Mayors Strike Delicate Balance, TENN. LEDGER, July 30, 2016, at 2, 6; 
Tennessee Star Staff, Vanderbilt Poll: Nashville a Blue City in a Red State; Majority of City’s Residents 
Disapprove of President Trump, TENN. STAR (Apr. 1, 2017), http://tennesseestar.com/2017/04/01/ 
vanderbilt-poll-nashville-a-blue-city-in-a-red-state-majority-of-citys-residents-disapprove-of-
president-trump/. 
 37 See QuickFacts: Nashville-Davidson (Balance), Tennessee; Davidson County, Tennessee, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, 
https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/fact/table/nashvilledavidsonbalancetennessee,davidsoncoun
tytennessee/PST045218 (last visited Mar. 1, 2019) (stating demographic makeup of the City of 
Nashville is White alone 63.1%; Black or African American alone 27.8%;  American Indian and 
Alaska Native alone 0.3%; Asian alone 3.6%; Hispanic or Latino 10.4%; and White alone, not 
Hispanic or Latino 55.6%); see also Mary Hance, 11 Things You Should Know About Nashville’s Diversity: 
Nashville Is More Culturally Rich Than You Might Think, TENNESSEAN (Sept. 30, 2017, 10:00 AM) 
https://www.tennessean.com/story/life/shopping/ms-cheap/2017/09/30/11-things-you-
should-know-nashvilles-diversity/699228001/ (last updated Oct. 2, 2017, 4:19 PM) (citing Mayor 
Megan Barry’s office and Nashville Culture Festival officials). 
 38 Nashville, Tenn., Ordinance No. BL2017-739, § 11.34.020 (introduced June 6, 2017 and 
withdrawn July 6, 2017), https://www.nashville.gov/mc/ordinances/term_2015_2019/ 
bl2017_739.htm; see also Cari Wade Gervin, Legislators Vow Battle over Metro Ordinance, NASHVILLE 
POST (June 22, 2017), https://www.nashvillepost.com/politics/metro-government/article/ 
20865568/legislators-vow-battle-over-metro-ordinance.  
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required39 and prohibited law enforcement from inquiring into an 
individual’s immigration status.40 
Like most sanctuary policies, the underlying premise of the ordinance was 
to encourage “cooperation of immigrant residents, and trust between 
communities and public agencies, [which] is critical to fulfilling the mission 
and duties of the city; and trust between the immigrant community and local 
law enforcement [which] is critical to promoting public safety for our entire 
city.”41 
The Nashville city ordinance did not pass.42  Former Tennessee 
Republican Congresswoman Diane Black critiqued the ordinance stating 
that “[i]t’s time for [Nashville] Mayor Barry to stop borrowing liberal policies 
from California and New York and start putting the safety and security of 
Tennessee families first.”43  
Diane Black’s response highlights the politically polarized manner in 
which sanctuary policies are evaluated and considered.  There is no inquiry 
into whether states and localities are properly exercising their Tenth 
Amendment police powers or whether states and localities are usurping 
federal authority in regulating immigrants within its borders. 
Another city in Tennessee, Knoxville, has a county and a city 
government.44  The city and county governments are diametrically opposed 
in relation to sub-federal immigration regulation.  In 2017, approximately 
 
 39 Nashville, Tenn., Ordinance No. BL2017-739, § 11.34.020 (introduced June 6, 2017 and 
withdrawn July 6, 2017). 
 40 Id. 
 41 Id. 
 42 Id. 
 43 Jonquil Rose Newland, Sanctuary City-Like Ordinance Advanced by Metro Council, NEWS CHANNEL 5 
NASHVILLE (June 20, 2017, 10:36 PM), https://www.newschannel5.com/news/sanctuary-city-
like-ordinance-passed-by-metro-council (last updated June 21, 2017, 5:45 AM).  
 44 See Joey Garrison, Mayors Remain Source of Strength for Tennessee Democrats, TENNESSEAN (July 22, 2016, 
11:59 AM), https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/2016/07/22/mayors-remain-
source-strength-tennessee-democrats/87135326/ (last updated July 24, 2016, 7:25 AM) (“As the 
state has reddened politically, mayors of Nashville, Memphis, Chattanooga and Knoxville—all 
Democrats—have become the strength of the party and a bench as its looks for viable candidates 
for governor and U.S. Senate.  In recent years, party leaders have routinely pointed to the crop of 
mayors as the centerpiece of a strategy for Democrats to make a comeback.”); see also Michael 
Collins, Tennessee Politics: State Increasingly Split Along Urban-Rural Lines, TENNESSEAN (Nov. 4, 2016, 
6:02 AM), https://www.tennessean.com/story/news/politics/2016/11/04/tennessee-politics-
state-increasingly-split-along-urban-rural-lines/93232774/ (last updated Nov. 4, 2016, 11:06 AM); 
Tyler Whetstone, Five Things Learned from Knox County Election, KNOX NEWS (Nov. 7, 2018, 5:00 AM), 
https://www.knoxnews.com/story/news/politics/elections/2018/11/07/five-things-learned-
knox-county-election/1910687002/ (last updated Nov. 7, 2018, 11:59 AM) (confirming that the 
Republican party in 2018 still maintains control over Knox County and stating that “[i]n this year’s 
election, as in other recent electoral contests, the political views of Tennesseans are shaped not just 
by party and ideology but also by geography”); Zachsearcy, A Heat Map of Knox County’s 2016 Election 
Results by Precinct, REDDIT KNOXVILLE (Nov. 11, 2016, 9:55 PM), https://www.reddit.com/r/ 
Knoxville/comments/5ciilw/a_heat_map_of_knox_countys_2016_election_results/ (confirming 
Republican county and Democrat city). 
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187,347 people resided in the City of Knoxville and 461,860 in the 
surrounding Knox County.45  In 2013, the Knox County Sheriff vowed he 
“will continue to enforce these federal immigration violations with or without 
the help of U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE).  If need be, 
I will stack these violators like cordwood in the Knox County Jail until the 
appropriate federal agency responds.”46  
The Knox County Sheriff’s rhetoric mirrors polarizing statements across 
the country.  The rhetoric is often based in fear.  Americans are told that 
immigrants are taking their jobs, using up tax money, raising crime rates, 
and are an affront to cultural norms.47  The Knox County Sheriff’s 
comments exemplify a common phenomenon when it comes to the debate 
on immigration reform: the objectification of immigrants.  The Knox 
County Sheriff’s comments led to the 2017 implementation of Knox County 
and federal government cooperation in the apprehension and detention of 
immigrants—called 287(g) programs.48  Knox County is the only local 
government in the State of Tennessee with this type of enforcement 
agreement. 
Knox County’s policies conflict with the Mayor of the City of Knoxville 
who declared: “While we are not a sanctuary city we are and will remain a 
welcoming city—welcoming city to people of all races, ages, genders, 





 45 QuickFacts: Knoxville City, Tennessee, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 2017), https://www.census.gov/ 
quickfacts/knoxvillecitytennessee; QuickFacts: Knox County, Tennessee, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (July 1, 
2017), https://www.census.gov/quickfacts/knoxcountytennessee.  
 46 Hedy Weinberg, ACLU Warns Knox County Sheriff Acting upon His Statements Would Violate Law, ACLU 
TENN. (Aug. 28, 2013), http://www.aclu-tn.org/aclu-warns-knox-county-sheriff-acting-upon-
statements-violate-law/. 
 47 Ted Brader, Nicholas A. Valentino, & Elizabeth Suhay, What Triggers Public Opposition to Immigration? 
Anxiety, Group Cues, and Immigration Threat, 52 AM. J. POL. SCI. 959, 959 (2008). 
 48 See Michael Crowe, Knox Co. Sheriff Approved for ICE Partnership; Only Agency in TN, WBIR.COM (June 
29, 2017, 8:46 PM), https://www.wbir.com/article/news/local/knox-co-sheriff-approved-for-ice-
partnership-only-agency-in-tn/51-453026435 (confirming Knox County Sheriff entering into 
287(g) agreement program with federal government in 2017 and stating that “Jones [Knox County 
Sheriff] drew criticism in 2013, after the first application was denied, for saying he would ‘stack 
these violators like cordwood in the Knox County Jail until the appropriate federal agency 
respond’”); Tyler Whetstone, Immigrant Rights Group to Deliver Hundreds of Letters Against ICE Partnership, 
KNOX NEWS (Apr. 4, 2019, 9:37 PM), https://www.knoxnews.com/story/news/politics/2019/ 
04/04/immigrant-rights-group-deliver-hundreds-letters-opposing-287-g-ice-knox-county-sheriff/ 
3345402002/ (last updated Apr. 5, 2019, 3:03 PM) (stating “Former Knox County Sheriff Jimmy 
‘J.J.’ Jones signed the two-year 287(g) agreement in June 2017”). 
 49 Tyler Whetstone, Knoxville Mayor: Keep Hearts Open to Immigrants, KNOX NEWS (Jan. 31, 2017, 8:47 
PM), https://www.knoxnews.com/story/news/local/2017/01/31/knoxville-mayor-keep-hearts-
open-immigrants/97290414/ (last updated Jan. 31, 2017, 9:47 PM). 
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Knoxville’s mayor reiterated the police department’s longstanding policy 
to not inquire into a person’s immigration status.50  Like many police 
departments across the country, not inquiring into a person’s immigration 
status promotes people “feel[ing] comfortable calling the police department 
if they need help.”51  
In the other large metropolitan area in Tennessee, Memphis, the mayor 
made an informal declaration that the City would be welcoming to 
immigrants.52  In support of this declaration, the spokesperson for the 
Memphis Police stated that the police would have little interaction with ICE 
agents.53  Memphis ultimately did not pass a sanctuary ordinance.54  
Even though no sanctuary laws were passed in cities and municipalities 
throughout the State of Tennessee, in 2017 the majority Republican state 
legislature proposed and enacted an anti-sanctuary jurisdiction law.55  The 
law was in response to the proposed Nashville city ordinance.  The legislature 
believed that Nashville’s proposed ordinance exposed how a local 
government could circumvent Tennessee’s 2009 anti-sanctuary law.56  
“Proponents of the measure, including state Sen. Mark Green—the bill’s 
sponsor—and [former] U.S. Rep. Diane Black, who is seeking the GOP 
nomination for governor, also tried to pressure the governor.  They argued 
the legislation is necessary in order to ensure there are no sanctuary cities in 
Tennessee.”57 
In May 2018, Tennessee Governor Bill Haslam allowed the anti-
sanctuary law bill to become law without his signature.58  The law went into 
effect on January 1, 2019.59  The main provision of the law prohibits state 
and local governmental entities and officials from adopting sanctuary 
policies.  If a city or local government adopts a sanctuary policy, the local 
entity is ineligible for state funding until the policy is repealed.60  The law 
 
 50 Id. 
 51 Id. 
 52 Ryan Poe, What Tennessee’s New Sanctuary Cities Ban Means to Shelby County, COM. APPEAL (May 21, 
2018, 11:14 AM), https://www.commercialappeal.com/story/news/government/county/2018/ 
05/21/what-tennessees-new-sanctuary-cities-ban-means-shelby-county/628741002/ (last updated 
May 21, 2018, 5:57 PM). 
 53 Id.  
 54 Id. 
 55 H.B. 2315, 110th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Tenn. 2018) (enacted). 
 56 Joel Elbert, Gov. Bill Haslam to Allow Measure Banning Sanctuary Cities, Ordering ICE Compliance to Become Law 
Without Signature, TENNESSEAN (May 21, 2018, 10:23 AM), https://www.tennessean.com/story/ 
news/politics/2018/05/21/gov-bill-haslam-allow-measure-banning-sanctuary-cities-ordering-ice-
compliance-become-law-without-si/565769002/ (last updated May 21, 2018, 2:37 PM).  
 57 Id. 
 58 Id. 
 59 Daniel Connolly, A Tennessee Immigration Law Goes into Effect Jan. 1 and Could Change Shelby County Policy, 
COMMERCIAL APPEAL (Dec. 27, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.commercialappeal.com/story/ 
news/2018/12/27/tennessse-sanctuary-city-bill-shelby-county/2342891002/. 
 60 TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 4-42-101–104 (2019).  
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also requires all law enforcement officers to inquire into a person’s 
immigration status and punishes local governments if their law enforcement 
agencies adopt, formally or informally, policies or practices that limit 
entanglement with federal immigration enforcement.61  It permits law 
enforcement agencies to enter into 287(g) memorandums of agreement with 
federal officials concerning enforcement of federal immigration laws.62 
Tennessee’s anti-sanctuary law requires the state courts to evaluate 
violations of the law, which may require state courts to engage in an analysis 
of immigration law.63  The law requires courts to assess and interpret 
provisions of the Immigration and Nationality Act.64  Specifically, when 
courts assess violations of the law, the courts run the risk of beginning to 
interpret whether an individual is lawfully present in the United States.  An 
individual’s immigration status is a complex area of immigration law for 
which Congress created a comprehensive administrative immigration 
system.65  
The pattern in Tennessee follows a similar trend across the United States.  
The trend has been for urban cities or Democrat dominated legislatures to 
pass sanctuary laws while rural areas and Republican dominated legislatures 
are passing exclusionary immigration laws.66  Certainly, the intrastate 
dynamics between the sanctuary friendly cities and the immigrant adverse 










 61 § 4-42-102. 
 62 § 7-68-105. 
 63 § 4-42-104. 
 64 Id. 
 65 “The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 . . . rivals the tax code in the level of detail, 
confusion, and absurd consequences produced by years of layering on provisions without 
systematically reviewing their results.”  AM. IMMIGRATION COUNCIL, COMPREHENSIVE 
IMMIGRATION REFORM: A PRIMER 1 (2009), https://www.americanimmigrationcouncil.org/ 
research/comprehensive-immigration-reform-primer; see also U.S. Immigration Law: The Big Picture, 
NOLO, http://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/us-immigration-law-the-big-picture (last 
visited Mar. 1, 2019) (attesting that immigration law is “[w]idely considered more complex than 
the tax code”). 
 66 See Tim Henderson, Cities, States Resist—and Assist—Immigration Crackdown in New Ways, PEW (Aug. 
3, 2018), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/blogs/stateline/2018/08/03/ 
cities-states-resist-and-assist-immigration-crackdown-in-new-ways. 
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III.  COURT BATTLES AND IMPLICATIONS OF CONTINUED SUB-FEDERAL 
REGULATION 
The sub-federal battle has generated federal litigation across the 
country.67  The litigation has been between states and localities—
highlighting the red state and blue city divide.68   This divide has increased 
with the Trump Administration’s immigration policies and the January 25, 
2017 Executive Order attempting to defund sanctuary states and cities.69  
On January 25, 2017, President Donald Trump issued an Executive 
Order addressing immigration enforcement issues, including the use of state 
and local law enforcement.70  The Executive Order acknowledged the need 
to “cooperate fully with States and local law enforcement in enacting 
Federal-State partnerships to enforce Federal immigration priorities, as well 
as State monitoring and detention programs that are consistent with Federal 
law and do not undermine Federal immigration priorities.”71  
In addition, on May 22, 2017, the Attorney General issued a memo 
stating that sanctuary jurisdictions who willfully refuse to comply with 
Section 1373  of the INA are not eligible to receive federal grants 
administered by the Department of Justice or the Department of Homeland 
Security.72  Section 1373 requires cooperation between the Department of 
Homeland Security and state and local entities.  It specifically provides that 




 67 See, e.g., United States v. California, 314 F. Supp. 3d 1077 (E.D. Cal. 2018) (seeking an injunction 
to prevent the application of certain of California’s sanctuary city policies as preempted by federal 
immigration law); California ex rel. Becerra v. Sessions, 284 F. Supp. 3d 1015 (N.D. Cal. 2018) 
(denying motion for preliminary injunction); City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 
3d 924 (N.D. Cal. 2018) (challenging the Trump Administration’s anti-sanctuary city policies and 
alleging that the Administration is exercising unconstitutionally excessive power over immigration 
policy.).  
 68 Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793 (Jan. 25, 2017). 
 69 See cases cited infra note 74. 
 70 See, e.g., City of El Cenizo v. Texas, 890 F.3d 164 (5th Cir. 2018); Texas v. Travis Cty., 910 F.3d 
809 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 71 Exec. Order No. 13,767, 82 Fed. Reg. 8793, at § (e) (Jan. 25, 2017). 
 72 Memorandum from Jefferson Sessions, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t of Justice, on Implementation of 
Executive Order 13768 (May 22, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/press-release/file/968146/ 
download. 
 73 8 U.S.C. § 1373(a) (2012) (“Notwithstanding any other provision of Federal, State, or local law, a 
Federal, State, or local government entity or official may not prohibit, or in any way restrict, any 
government entity or official from sending to, or receiving from, the Immigration and 
Naturalization Service information regarding the citizenship or immigration status, lawful or 
unlawful, of any individual.”).  Section 1373 has subsequently been held to be unconstitutional by 
New York v. Department of Justice, 343 F. Supp. 3d 213 (S.D.N.Y. 2018) and City & County of San 
Francisco v. Sessions, 349 F. Supp. 3d 924 (N.D. Cal. 2018). 
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In response to the Trump Administration, in January 2019, at least 120 
communities enacted sanctuary policies which limit assistance in the 
enforcement of federal immigration law and twenty-eight states have at least 
one jurisdiction that enacted a sanctuary policy in the last two years.74  The 
Trump Administration has not been successful in state and local litigation 
challenging the Administration’s memo attempting to defund sanctuary 
states, cities, and localities.75  The United States District Courts in California, 




 74 The Success of Sanctuary Under Trump, IMMIGRANT LEGAL RESOURCE CTR. (Jan. 21, 2019), 
https://www.ilrc.org/success-sanctuary-under-trump. 
 75 Id.  On March 29, 2017, the City of Seattle commenced a lawsuit challenging President Trump’s 
Executive Order 13768.  City of Seattle v. Trump, No. 17-497-RAJ, 2017 WL 4700144 (W.D. 
Wash. Oct. 19, 2017).  The Executive Order denies federal funding to cities found to be in violation 
of 8 U.S.C. § 1373.  A city found to be in violation is labeled a “sanctuary city.”  The City requested 
that the court designate Seattle as in compliance with Section 1373 and further sought a declaration 
from the court that the law was in violation of the Tenth Amendment and the Spending Clause.  
In April, a nationwide preliminary injunction was instituted against the Executive Order.  On 
October 30, the parties filed a joint motion to stay proceedings until the resolution of County of 
Santa Clara v. Trump in the Ninth Circuit, and this motion was granted on October 31, 2017.  
 In City of West Palm Beach v. Sessions, No. 9:18-CV-80131-DMM (S.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2018), the 
Department of Justice threatened to withhold federal Byrne JAG funding from the City of West 
Palm Beach (similar to the City of Philadelphia case) for ostensibly failing to comply with 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1373.  The federal government claimed that West Palm may be out of compliance and requested 
additional documentation; however, the City countered that they were in compliance with the 
original requirements and the additional DOJ-imposed requirements violated the Spending Clause.  
Further, the City argued that it was in compliance with federal law and was not a sanctuary city.  
The parties entered into mediation and it was decided that the city was in compliance with federal 
law.  City officials were encouraged in a memo to share any and all requested information, including 
citizenship and immigration status, with federal authorities and the city will retain its Byrne JAG 
federal funding.  The case was closed on March 29, 2018.  The settlement agreement, 
unfortunately, is not publicly available. 
 76 In City of Richmond v. Trump, No. 17-CV-01535-WHO, 2017 WL 3605216, (N.D. Cal. Aug. 21, 
2017), the City of Richmond in California brought suit against the federal government challenging 
President Trump’s Executive Order 13768 regarding immigration funding and the threat to 
withhold it from “sanctuary jurisdictions.”  The City argued that the order was unconstitutional 
because it violated the Separation of Powers and Spending Clauses and also violated the Tenth 
Amendment by forcing cities to choose between losing federal funding and upholding their own 
laws.  The defendants replied that the plaintiffs have not demonstrated any concrete harm because 
no action had been initiated against the City of Richmond.  Judge Orrick, who is currently handing 
a number of related cases, invited Richmond to file an amicus brief in the Santa Clara/San 
Francisco litigation.  The city chose to do so and this case was dismissed on August 21, 2017.  If the 
city is targeted in the future, it could bring a case at that time. 
In City & County of San Francisco v. Trump, No. 4:17-CV-00485-DMR, 2017 WL 412999 (N.D. 
Cal. Jan. 31, 2017) and County of Santa Clara v. Trump, 250 F. Supp. 3d 497 (N.D. Cal. 2017), the 
district court held that President Trump’s executive order was unconstitutional and on April 25, 
2018, issued a nationwide injunction enjoining defendants from enforcing section 9(a) of the 
executive order.  The case is ongoing.  In a 2-1 decision, the Court of Appeals held that the District 
Court properly granted summary judgment to the counties because the Executive Order violated 
Separation of Powers.  City & Cty. of San Francisco v. Trump, 897 F.3d 1225, 1245 (9th Cir. 2018).  
However, the court held that the nationwide injunction was overly broad and limited it to 
California.  Id.  The court remanded to the district court.  Id.  
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In City of Philadelphia v. Trump, Philadelphia challenged the Attorney 
General’s memo. The City of Philadelphia received Byrne Justice Assistance 
Grants (“JAG”) Program funding which would be defunded under the 
Attorney General’s memo.77  Even though the city of Philadelphia is not 
officially a sanctuary jurisdiction, the City developed policies to establish trust 
with immigrant communities to encourage the reporting of crimes.78  In 
2017, the Department of Justice added additional criteria for receipt of Byrne 
funding in an attempt to defund sanctuary jurisdictions.  Specifically, the 
Department of Justice provided that in order to receive Byrne funding a city 
had to: (1) allow federal immigration agents to access the city’s detention 
facilities; (2) provide the Department of Homeland Security at least forty-
eight hours advance notice of when an immigrant would be released from 
the city’s custody; and (3) certify that the city is in compliance with 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1373.79 
The City of Philadelphia argued that the new conditions placed on the 
Byrne funding “commandeer[ed] City officials into the enforcement of 
federal immigration law in violation of the Tenth Amendment.”80  The City 
sought, and the district court granted, declaratory and injunctive relief.81 
Significantly, the District Court found that Philadelphia’s policies were 
adopted in good faith to protect individual civil rights.82  The Third Circuit 
stated: “[t]he City assumes great risk if it violates individuals’ civil rights, 
which would, inter alia, subject the City to endless litigation and very 
expensive damage claims for violating civil rights of prisoners.”83 Thus, the 
court also held that even if the funding conditions were valid, Philadelphia 
was in compliance or substantial compliance with the conditions.84 
In addition to the Administration’s attempt to defund states and localities, 
the intrastate battles have also spurred a barrage of lawsuits.  Tennessee 
enacted its law after a federal district court in City of El Cenizo  v. Texas upheld 
Texas’s 2017 anti-sanctuary law.85  Texas’s anti-sanctuary law similarly 
permitted local law enforcement officers to question the immigration status 
of people they detain or arrest.86  Texas, like Tennessee, is another red state, 
 
 77 City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 309 F. Supp. 3d 289 (E.D. Pa. 2018). 
 78 Id. at 297. 
 79 City of Philadelphia v. Sessions, 280 F. Supp. 3d 579, 595 (E.D. Pa. 2017). 
 80 Id. at 591.  
 81 309 F. Supp. 3d at 344–45. 
 82 Id.  
 83 Id. at 316. 
 84 Id.  
 85 890 F.3d 164, 173 (5th Cir. 2018). 
 86 Henderson, supra note 18. 
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blue city jurisdiction where multiple cities—Houston,87 Austin,88 and 
Dallas89— proposed and enforced sanctuary laws, resolutions, and policies.  
In City of El Cenizo v. Texas, cities and localities filed a lawsuit challenging 
the State’s law.90  The Texas law prohibited local authorities from limiting 
their cooperation with federal immigration enforcement, and required local 
officers to comply with ICE detainer requests for immigrants in custody.91  
The complaint alleged multiple constitutional violations including that the 
Texas law was preempted by federal immigration law.92 
The Texas law also banned state and local entities from prohibiting or 
preventing local entities from inquiring into the immigration status of 
lawfully detained individuals. 93  The law, like the Tennessee law, established 
a system whereby the Texas Attorney General enforces the law through the 
creation of a complaint structure whereby private citizens could file 
complaints alleging violations of the law.94  Upon determining that such a 
complaint is valid, the Attorney General may file suit in state court to enforce 
 
 87 Harris County in which Houston is located the Harris County Sheriff’s Office confirms it does not 
require its employees to ask the residency of anyone detained or arrested.  See Julián Aguilar, Travis 
County Sheriff Announces New “Sanctuary” Policy, TEX. TRIB. (Jan. 20, 2017, 5:00 PM), 
https://www.texastribune.org/2017/01/20/travis-county-sheriff-announces-new-sanctuary-poli/ 
(“A Friday announcement by newly-elected Travis County Sheriff Sally Hernandez that her office 
would reduce cooperation with federal immigration authorities . . . .”); Melissa Correa, Sanctuary 
Sities: Can You Find Them in Texas?, KHOU 11 (Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.khou.com/article/ 
news/sanctuary-cities-can-you-find-them-in-texas/285-ca1811f2-a32e-40cf-a15b-2dbb9670a25f 
(“The Houston Police Department confirms it’s complying with SB-4, giving officers discretion to 
ask a person’s legal status.  The Harris County Sheriff’s Office confirms it does not require its 
employees to ask the residency of anyone detained or arrested.”); Edwin Rios, The First Big Fight 
Over Sanctuary Cities Pits a Latina Sheriff Against Texas’ Governor, MOTHERJONES (Jan. 27, 2017), 
https://www.motherjones.com/politics/2017/01/texas-greg-abbott-austin-sanctuary-city-
immigration/. 
 88 Austin, Tex., Resolution 20180614-073 (June 14, 2018); John Barned-Smith & Lomi Kriel, 
Sanctuary Cities Bill Ire of Local Law Enforcement, Civil Rights Advocates, CHRON (May 5, 2017, 11:59 
AM), https://www.chron.com/news/houston-texas/houston/article/Sanctuary-cities-bill-draws-
ire-of-local-law-11122854.php (“Travis County Sheriff Sally Hernandez, who announced that she 
would stop cooperating with most U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement requests to hold 
immigrants while federal authorities investigate their status.”).   
 89 Memorandum from City Manager T.C. Broadnax to Mayor and Members of Dallas City Council 
(Sept. 21, 2018), https://dallascityhall.com/government/citymanager/Documents/FY17-
18%20Memos/Welcoming-Plan-Recommendations-and-Resolution_Memo_092118.pdf; 
Stephen Young, Dallas County Passes Resolution Supporting Undocumented Residents, DALL. OBSERVER 
(Feb. 8, 2017, 7:25 AM), https://www.dallasobserver.com/news/dallas-county-passes-resolution-
supporting-undocumented-residents-9164779; Brandi Grissom & Dianne Solís, Abbott Targets 
Sanctuary Cities, Dallas Sheriff’s New Policy, DALL. NEWS (Oct. 26, 2015), 
https://www.dallasnews.com/news/local-politics/2015/10/26/abbott-targets-sanctuary-cities-
dallas-sheriffs-new-policy. 
 90 890 F.3d at 173. 
 91 Id.  
 92 Id.  
 93 Id. at 174.  
 94 Id. at 175 (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE § 752.055(a) (2017)). 
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the law.95  State and local officials’ violations of the law would result in their 
removal from office.96  
The Texas law was the subject of an appeal to the Fifth Circuit.  In the 
case, the Circuit Court examined whether the INA preempted Texas anti-
sanctuary law.  The Fifth Circuit’s preemption analysis evaluated both field 
and conflict preemption doctrines and relied upon the Supreme Court’s 
federal preemption cases Arizona v. United States97 and De Canas v. Bica.98  The 
court held that Congress had not manifested a clear and manifest purpose to 
oust state power to regulate immigration.99  Accordingly, there was no field 
preemption.100  The court found that while the INA regulates how local 
entities cooperate in immigration enforcement, the Texas law only specified 
whether state and local governments can cooperate.  The court also held that 
there was no conflict between the INA and the Texas law.101 
In addition, the court found that no conflict preemption existed between 
the Texas law and immigration laws.102  The court relied upon principles 
articulated in Arizona v. United States103 and Chamber of Commerce of United States 
v. Whiting,104 where the Supreme Court articulated that it is not the courts’ 
job to engage in a “‘freewheeling judicial inquiry into whether a state statute 
is in tension with federal objectives’ because ‘such an endeavor would 
undercut the principle that it is Congress rather than the courts that preempts 
state law.’”105   
This case demonstrates an overall trend of federal courts construing state 
regulation of immigration broadly.  The broad construction permits states to 
cooperate with the federal government in the enforcement of immigration 
laws.  City of El Cenizo also demonstrates that when a state legislates 
cooperation there is little room for local governments, cities, and counties to 
carve out their own sanctuary policies.  
 
 95 Id. (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE § 752.0565(b) (2017)). 
 96 Id. (citing TEX. GOV’T CODE § 752.0565(c)). 
 97 Id. at 176 (citing Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387, 399 (2012)).  
 98 Id. (citing De Canas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 357 (1976)). 
 99 Id. (citing De Canas, 424 U.S. at 357). 
 100 Id. at 177–78 (first citing Arizona, 567 U.S. at 400–02 (defining the relevant field as “alien 
registration”); and then citing De Canas, 424 U.S. at 360 n.8 (“Every Act of Congress occupies some 
field, but we must know the boundaries of that field before we can say that it has precluded a state 
from the exercise of any power reserved to it by the Constitution.”)). 
 101 City of El Cenizo, 890 F.3d at 178. 
 102 Id. at 178 (“Conflict preemption occurs when “compliance with both federal and state regulations 
is a physical impossibility. . . or when a state law stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and 
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress.” (internal citations and quotation marks 
omitted)). 
 103 Id. at 179–80 (citing Arizona, 567 U.S. at 399, 411–15). 
 104 City of El Cenizo, 890 F.3d at 179–80 (citing Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Whiting, 563 U.S. 
582, 607 (2011)). 
 105 Id. at 180 (quoting Whiting, 563 U.S. at 607). 
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Even after the Texas ruling, in June 2018, the City of Austin passed a 
Freedom City initiative—intended to be different from sanctuary policies but 
addressing similar issues.106  The three components of the policy are: “(1) To 
direct the Austin Police Department in ending ‘unnecessary arrests;”’ “(2) To 
make sure the immigrant community members are aware of all their rights;” 
and “(3) To mend the trust/relationships between community members and 
law enforcement.”107   
Resolution 73 charges the City of Austin to reduce racial disparities in arrests 
and eliminate the low-level arrests that the Austin Police Department doesn’t 
have to make in the first place.  Arrests for low-level charges contribute to 
racial disparities in the Travis County Jail.  Under SB 4, they are also a ticket 
to detention and deportation. 
  Resolution 74 directs the City of Austin to create policies that create 
protections for immigrant community members and their constitutional 
rights under SB 4, including requiring that police officers who ask about 
immigration status also inform people of their right to not answer.  It also 
requires officers to complete a report explaining the encounter and the 
circumstances leading them to ask for immigration status.108 
The resolution is crafted very broadly.  It also addressed overall policing 
misconduct that operates at the intersection of race, class, and immigration 
status. 
On February 27, 2019, the Albuquerque Bernalillo County Commission 
passed a non-discrimination resolution, similar to the city of Austin’s 
policy.109  The Albuquerque resolution not only limits the information that 
can be shared with the Department of Homeland Security, it also broadly 
protects the following:  
[S]ocial security number or individual tax identification number or lack of 
such numbers, an inmate’s custody release date, a person’s place and date of 
birth, a person’s status as a recipient of public assistance or as a crime victim, 
a person’s home or work address, a person’s employment information, a 
 
 106 See Adam Edelman, The Crackdown on Sanctuary Cities Gives Birth to ‘Freedom Cities,’ NBS NEWS (Sept. 
15, 2018, 8:08 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/immigration/crackdown-sanctuary-
cities-gives-birth-freedom-cities-n909606 (stating new “freedom cities” include Madison, 
Wisconsin; Portland, Oregon; Ann Arbor, Michigan; Albany, California; Silver City, New Mexico, 
among others). 
 107 Leslie Adami, Councilman Casar Introduces Freedom City Policy Ahead of Thursday’s Meeting, ABC: KVUE 
(June 12, 2018, 5:55 PM), https://www.kvue.com/article/news/local/councilman-casar-
introduces-freedom-city-policy-ahead-of-thursdays-meeting/269-563852479 (last updated June 
12, 2018, 6:23 PM).  
 108 Press Release, Grassroots Leadership, As Austin’s Freedom City Policy Goes into Effect Today, 
Organizers Explain Why It Matters (Nov. 1, 2018), 
https://grassrootsleadership.org/releases/2018/11/austin-s-freedom-city-policy-goes-effect-
today-organizers-explain-why-it-matters. 
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person’s sexual orientation, gender identity, physical or mental disability, 
religion, or national origin.110  
The goal of the policy is to “create new ways for city officials to comply 
legally with federal rules and state laws, while still protecting undocumented 
immigrants.”111  So far there are no legal challenges to the Austin Freedom 
City Resolution.  Other cities—Madison, Wisconsin; Portland, Oregon; Ann 
Arbor, Michigan; Albany, California; and Silver City, New Mexico—have 
passed similar resolutions and ordinances.112  The issue will be whether the 
broad exercise of localities’ powers to regulate individuals within their 
jurisdictions will prevent challenges to the immigration parts of the Austin 
Freedom City-like resolutions. 
 CONCLUSION 
The intrastate battles demonstrate how diverse political geographies 
create varied immigration policies within one state.  More specifically the 
political battle lines have often been drawn between Republican states and 
Democrat cities within those states.  Within this battle, Republican states are 
promoting the Trump Administration’s restrictive immigration policies while 
cities attempt to protect immigrants within their communities.113  Early 
immigration federalism scholarship focused on the contours of whether state 
or local action was preempted and which body (local, state, or federal) was 
the appropriate entity to regulate immigration.  The legal landscape has 
changed to a politically charged one in which the influence of interest groups 
promoting ideological stances cannot be discounted.  With this change, 
scholars must pay attention to how the red state and blue city political 
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